Apollo/Saturn 1B flight safety plan vehicle AS-204/LM 1 by unknown
K-IB-02.13/4 
APOLLO/SATURN IB 
FLIGHT SAFETY PLAN 
VEHICLE AS-204/LMl 
December 15, 1967 
APPROVED: 
k d- L- 
Arthur H. Moore, Chief 
Flight Safety Staff, TS-TSM-1 
R. L. Clark, Director 
Technical Support, TS 
R. 0. Middleton 
Apollo Program Manager, AP 
Rocco A .  Petrone, Director 
Launch Operations, LO 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19680006725 2020-03-23T23:40:58+00:00Z
K-IB-02.13/4 
LIST OF EFFECTIVE P A G E S  
Insert latest changes; destroy superseded pages. 
T O T A L  NUMBER OF PAGES IN THIS DOCUMENT I S  22, CONSISTING OF: 
Issue -Page No. 
i 
1-1 
1 -2 
2 -1 
2 -2 
3 -1 
3-4 
4-1 
4 -6 
5 -1 
5 -2 
A - 1  
A -2 
thru iv 
blank 
b Ian k 
thm 3-3 
blank 
thm 4-5 
blank 
blank 
blank 
Orig ina I 
Ori g i na I 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Ori g i na I 
Ori g ina I 
Original 
Ori gina I 
Original 
Ori gi na I 
Original 
Original 
ii 
SECTION 
I INTRODUCTION 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
T ITLE PAGE 
i 
* I1 
2.1 
2.2 
111 
3.1 
I V  
4.1 
4.2 
4.2.1 
4.2.2 
4.2.3 
4.3 
4.4 
4.4.1 
4.4.2 
4.4.3 
4.4.4 
V 
5.1 
APPENDIX 
A 
FLIGHT SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES 
FLIGHT SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
FLIGHT SAFETY RESTRICTIONS 
FLIGHT SAFETY INSTRUMENTATION 
4-1 
4-1 
4-1 
4-1 
4-1 
4-1 
4-1 
4-4 
4-4 
4-4 
4-4 
DOCUMENT CATEGORY A - 1  
iii 
FIGURE 
L IST  OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
T I T L E  PAGE 
3-1 Propellant Dispersion Ordnance-Shaped Charge Locations ---- 3-2 
4-1 4-2 
4-3 4-2 
3-2 Propellant Dispersion System Block Diagram ---------------- 3-3 
1 Sigma Annual Wind Profi le from 65-Degree Azimuth ------- 
AS-204/LM 1 Impact L imi t  L jnes ........................ 
i v  
SECTION II 
FL I G H T SAFETY F? ES PON SI B! LI TI E S 
2 .1 AIR FORCE EASTERN TEST RANGE 
The Webb-McNamara agreement of January 17 , 1963 , supplemented by the AFMTC/ 
L O C  agreements of June 5, 1963, places the responsibility for f l ight safety of a l l  
launches from the AFETR on the AFETR commander. This responsibility includes 
specifying f l ight termination system requirements; protecting l i fe and property from an 
errant vehicle (except within KSC); establishing data requirements, impact l imi t  lines , 
fl ight safety instrumentation requirements, etc. 
2.2 KENNEDYSPACECENTER 
The Director, KSC , by the same agreements cited in  paragraph 2.1, i s  responsible for 
the protection of l i fe  and property within KSC from an errant vehicle launched or intended 
to be launched from Cape Kennedy or KSC. This responsibility includes designating 
launch danger areas within KSC, clearing these areas during danger periods, etc. Also 
included i s  the responsibility for crew safety on manned launches from KSC. This re- 
sponsibility does not include Range Safety f l ight termination control of the vehicle after 
l i f t-off ,  which i s  the sole responsibility of the AFETR commander. To that extent, the 
protection of l i fe  and property within KSC is a jo int  effort of KSC and AFETR. 
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SECTION 111 
FLIGHT SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
... 
3-1 FLIGHT TERMINATION SYSTEMS 
Al l  bal l ist ic or space booster vehicles launched at  the AFETR must contain two independent 
f l ight termination systems that are compatible with the AFETR ground system. The two 
systems must be installed on the last powered stage and must be capable of destroying 
a l l  powered stages of the vehicles. A command system i s  not required for stages that go 
into orbit prior to ignition. However, the stage must be capable of being destroyed by 
command from the preceding stage and also must contain an automatic fl ight termination 
system. Al l  stages that do not contain a command system must contain an automatic fl ight 
termination system. The automatic flight termination system destroys the thrust capability 
of the stage in the event of premature separation or breakoff from the other stages carrying 
a f l ight tetmination system. The termination system i s  automatically activated by mechanical 
means when premature separation or breakoff occurs. The manned portion of a space vehicle 
w i l l  not require a destruct system on manned flights. Propulsive systems that are not con- 
sidered a stage of a vehicle (retrorockets, escape rockets, payloads, etc.) and that present 
radiological , toxicological , or explosive hazards wi l l  require an automatic fl ight termination 
system i f  they have the capability of violating the launch area or f l ight safety lines. For 
I iquid-propelled vehicles , flight termination action must cause engine shutdown and fuel 
dispersion or intermixing , depending upon the nature of the propellants. 
The Apollo/Saturn IB carries two independent flight termination and propellant dispersion 
systems in each active booster stage. There i s  no destruct system associated with the 
Lunar Module (LM1). Figures 3-1 and 3-2 pictorially display the IB f l ight termination/ 
propellant dispersion system. 
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Figure 3-2. Propellant Dispersion System Block Diagram 
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SECTION IV 
FLIGHT SAFETY RESTRICTIONS 
4-1 PRECEDENCE 
The information contained in th is section is  disseminated several months before launch 
and i s  subject to change at  any time. In event of conflict between the Flight Safety 
Plan and the ApoIlo Mission Rules published for each launch, the Mission Rules shall 
be considered the of f ic ia l  source for procedures or requirements (the Mission Rules are 
constantly subject to revision/updating), 
4.2 WEAT HER RESTRICTIONS 
4.2.1 CEILING. A minimum ceil ing height i s  imposed on a l l  launches, The height 
of the cei l ing i s  determined by the time required for the launch area radars to acquire the 
vehicle after lift-off. The minimum ceiling for A S - 2 0 4 / L M 1  w i l l  be 800 feet. 
4.2.2 VISIBILCTY. A minimum visibi l i ty l imit i s  imposed on a l l  launches. The 
v is ib i l i ty  l imit i s  usually determined by the vertical wire skyscreen site selected for the 
launch. The minimum vis ib i l i ty  for A S - 2 0 4 / L M l  w i l l  be 4 miles. 
4.2.3 WINDS. A wind restriction i s  usually imposed on the launch if the vehicle re- 
mains over Cape Kennedy for any length of time. This restriction prevents pieces of a 
destricted vehicle from drifting into protected areas. The wind restriction for AS-204 /  
LM1 i s  a 1 sigma annual wind profile blowing from 65 degrees east of north (Figure 4-11 
and applicable to an altitude of 30 kilometers. In the event th is profile i s  violated by 
prevailing wind conditions during countdown , the Range Safety Division performs a 
computer-simulated flight , terminating thrust and breaking the vehicle into pieces at each 
interval, with the prevailing winds acting on them to determine i f  the pieces can fa l l  out- 
side the impact l imit lines. 
4.3 IMPACT LIMIT LINES 
The impact l imit lines to be used for the A S - 2 0 4 / L M l  launch are shown in Figure 4-2. 
The Cape Kennedy Range Safety Officer (CKRSO) w i l l  take range safety action, when 
necessary, to prevent the vehicle, or pieces thereof, from impacting outside the specified 
area. 
4.4 OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS 
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4 .-I. 1 
\ { ~ I I I ~ ,  le: 
LAUNCH VEHICLE. T i l e  following requirements are api)Iical)le to the launch 
a. Two operatioii;ll rn i~q l i  safety command receivers nn m c l i  stage (S-IB and 
S - I V 6 )  are niaiidatory for lauiicll . 
l 
a. The NASA Beriii~rc!~ DR S Cotntnaiid Control system i s  inanclatoty for Inuncli . 
b . 
for I,lllnch. 
The instr~itiiciit'ltioii iiiiit C-band beacon system (both Ileacons) are mandatory 
4 .4.2 SPACECRAFT. NOIIL. 
4 . 4 . 3  CREW SAFETY. Noiic 
-4 ~1 . 4  OTHER CONSIDERATIONS. Other acireernenls dii(I//or restrictions that have 
, ; ~ i i ( j  on the overall fliciht safcty area are as follows: 
b.  The NASA Berniiida (BDA) FPQ-6, BDA FPS-16, and t h  Graiicl Turk 
TPQ-18 radars (2 of 3 1iimdator.y) w i l l  provide raw data to the Cape I<ciinecly Realtirne 
Coiii:)uter System (RTCS) for the RSO impact prediction (IP) presentation. 
c .  An ETR RSO wi II l ie required to he at Beriiiiida for a l l  launch days. 
d .  Commiiiiicnti17tis I ) (  tween Mission Control Center (MCCH), the CKRSO and 
the Ewnuda RSO (BRSO) x c  iii4iiidc7tory for launch. 
e. Timers in t l lc  Capc Kennedy Ranye Control Center w i l l  provide a 2-second 
delay between ARM ancl @tSTRUCT.  
f .  Range safety action w i l l  not normally require DESTRUCT after S-16 staging. 
I f  Mantra1 Fuel Cut-olf (MFCO) does not establish an impact poillt (Jfter S-I6 staging), 
tlic R S O  w i l l  verbally reqiiest Flight (MCCH) to send ABORT followed by ENGINE STOP 
OVERRIDE. The RSO may elect to transmit DESTRUCT i f  the above procedure fai ls 
to terminate thrust. 
g. The RSO w i l l  send MFCO and request ENGINE STOP OVERRIDE of the 
MCCH whenever raiigc safety action i s  required. The NASA LM 1 Electrical, Environ- 
inents.1, and Comnlcinications Systems Engineer (LM1 EECOM) w i  II not reset the ENGINE 
STOP OVERRIDE command after any range safety action. 
h. The BRSO w i l l  transmit the SAFING command to the range safety command 
receivers after normal S-IVB cutoff. He wi II transmit the SAFING coininand only after 
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SECTION V 
FLIGHT SAFETY INSTRUMENTATION 
5.1 SAFETY DATA SOURCES 
The AFETR requires that a t  least two different, adequate sources of safety data for each 
phase of powered f l ight be operational at launch. An "adequate" source i s  defined as one 
that can protect the applicable impact l i m i t  l ine without endangering a normal missile. The 
RSO w i l l  ensure that the adequate data source requirement i s  met and that those requirements 
designated "crit ical" are provided before giving a launch clearance. Those items designated 
"cri t ical" for A S - 2 0 4 L M  1 are: 
a. Impact Predictor 
b. Bermuda Command Control Transmitter 
Instrumentation available during S-IB stage powered f l ight are: 
a. 
b. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
g. 
h. 
C. 
High Resolution Trackers (HRT) 1 & 2 
KSC TPQ-18 C-Band Radar (19.18) 
Patrick AFB TPQ-18 C-Band Radar (0.18) 
Glotrack Station I 
Program and FI ightline Electronic Sky Screen Equipment (ELSSE) 
Cape FPS-16 C-Band Radar (1.16) 
GBI TPQ-18 C-Band Radar (3.18) 
GBI TPQ-16 C-Band Radar (3.16) 
Instrumentation available during S-IVB stage powered f l ight are: 
a. KSC TPQ-18 C-Band Radar (19.18) 
b. Patrick AFB TPQ-18 C-Band Radar (0.18) 
c. GBI FPS-16  C-Band Radar (3.16) 
e.' Grand Turk TPQ-18 C-Band Radar (7.18) 
f. Fl ightl ine ELSSE 
g. Cape FPS-16 C Band Radar (1.16) 
h. BDA-6 
i. BDA-16 
j .  Glotrack Station 
d. GBI TPQ-18 (3.18) 
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APPENDIX A 
DOCUMENTCATEGORY 
APOLLO/SATURN IB  
FLIGHT SAFETY PLAN 
VEHICLE A S - 2 0 4 / L M 1  
Emphasis See 
Cat ego ry  Brief Description of Related Contents Pri. Sec. Pagek) 
11. Safety Plan presents f l ight safety requirements, X 
restrictions, and instrumentation neces- 
sary for each ApoilojSaturn IB iaunch. 
1-1 
A - 1/2 
~~ ~ 
DISTRIBUTION LIST K- IB-02.13/4 
This is.the in i t ia l  distribution at the date of printing. I f  changes in  distribution are 
required, contact Fl ight Safety Staff, TS-TSM-P. 
* 
, John F. Kennedy Space Center 
Dr. Debus 
Dr. Knothe 
Adm. Middleton 
blr. Keck 
Mr. Harper 
Mr. Mathews 
Mr. McCoy 
Mr. Petrone 
Mr. Donnelly 
Dr. Gruene 
Mr. Rigell 
Mr. Lealman 
Mr. Edwards 
Mr. Fannin 
Mr.  Picket 
Mr. O'Hara 
Mr. Twigg 
J F 2  Test Conductors 
Mr. Stone, Rm 205 , AF Hangar 
Mr. Walker, Rm 1205, E & L Bldg. 
Mr. Car0 
M r . W i I I iam s 
Mr. Clark 
Mr. Will iams 
Mr. Moore 
Mr. Smith 
Mr. Sendler 
Dr. Bruns 
Mr. Collins 
Mr. Atkins 
CD 
AP (2) 
EX-SCI 
AP-0 PN 
AP-PCO (2) 
AP-PCO-32 (2) 
AP-SAT (3) 
AP-SCO (2) 
LO (2) 
LO-OPN (2) 
L V  (2) 
LV-ENG 
LV-GDC 
LV-IN S 
LV-MEC 
LV-TOM 
LV-TOM 
LV-TOM-1 
LV-TOM-2 
DAC 
I BM 
RJ12 
LS (3) 
TS 
TS-TSMA 
TS-TSM-1 (5) 
TS-TSM-2 
IN-DAT 
IN-QAL 
IS-SAF (2) 
IS-CAS-42C (6)  
IS-CAS-112 (30) 
I N  
I -K-V 
I - K - l / l B  
Headquarters , National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Washington, D. C. 2 0 5 4 6  
Director 
Mr. White 
Mr. Shaw 
Mr. Holcomb 
Mr. Stout 
Mr. Schulherr 
Mr. Turgeon 
Mr. Mohrhauser 
Mr. Hickey 
Mr. Lee 
Mr. Lyman 
Manned Spacecraft Center 
Houston , Texas 77058 
Mr. Lunney 
Mu. Skopinski 
Mr. McAdams 
Mr. Kincaid 
George C. Marshall Space Fl ight  Center 
Huntsville, Alabama 35800 
Dr. Speer 
Valerie Norman 
Mr. Stone 
MAR 
MAR 
M A 0  
M A 0  
MAR-2 
ma0-2 
ma0-3 
MAS-4 (2) 
MAS-4 (2) 
MO-4 (2) 
MA-ZD 
NASA, Daytona Beach Operations 
P. 0. Box 2500 
Daytona Beach, Florida 32015 
FF (3) 
FM -5 
FM -3 
FM -3 
I-MO-MGR (3) 
I-MO-OL (2) 
R-AERO-F (5) 
. 
Scientific and Technical Information FaciI i ty  
P. 0. Box 33 
College Park, Maryland 20740 
Attn: S-AK/RKT NASA Representative (2) 
CCSD Systems Launch Branch 
Room 1166 E & L  Building 
Cape Kennedy , Florida 
L. H. Yount, Manager 
Total: 117 
